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“The philosophical principles of mathematics” :




Writings by Elie Cartan and Henri Cartan on Cavailles are presented
here, either in a first or new translation.
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Introduction : 1939 – 2019
Readers will find here translations of two texts by mathematicians Elie
Cartan and Henri Cartan; The father was a member of the jury of Cavailles’
thesis, the son a “faithful friend”1.
As to Elie Cartan’s, we are able to provide the following additional
information :
Having created the inventory for the archives of the French Society of
Philosophy – the same from which it is drawn – we can say its format is
typical of them : a speaker speaks, followed by a group discussion.
—
Elie Cartan had no qualms about admitting bluntly “I don’t under-
stand ... dialectics”. One should constantly keep in mind while reading
these lines that this was at a time when philosophy still reigned supreme
among all disciplines.23
He goes on to say he would much rather concentrate on the “purely
technical” (!) aspects of his discipline – word for word, he reminds us of
a certain class or category of computer scientists and technologists (the
mainstream, if not majority).
—
Jean Cavailles was perhaps the only one in his generation to be able to
undertake the type of work he did, argues Henri Cartan. “A philosophical
culture and solid mathematical training” he wrote himself. (Though the
same applied to Lautman, and probably others.)
—
Albert Lautman, mentioned regularly, was a friend of Cavailles4. They
shared many traits : the same type of education, the same area of the
philosophy of mathematics, he too a member of the Resistance, killed 5
months after Cavailles...
Many, except one :
Cavailles, we know, was Protestant – an information asserted by Georges
Canguilhem multiple times. Why? Presumably as a partial explanation
for his ethics, including dedication to his not-only scholarly tasks...
Lautman was Jewish.5
1This is according to a note found in the so-called “Complete works on science”. This
publication, in fact incomplete, is missing his first article (on the second definition of finite
sets by Dedekind) : removed, censored, because it appears they felt that it would shed a bad
light on Cavailles – a practice that is the exact opposite of science, in other words. Published
by or in cooperation with the CNRS, France’s national institution for research...
2Convince yourself of this by going further than Cartan senior’s contribution. Paul Levy,
next up, showed a significantly more subservient attitude : the poor fellow sure had made an
effort to make sense of it all... He cannot be blamed. (Him being a former student of the
Ecole Polytechnique, an engineer school, rather than the Ecole Normale Superieure (Cavailles,
Lautman, Cartan, and co.), a generalist one, must have also been a factor.)
3A smaller, but nonetheless considerable role is played today by economics, and economists;
mathematics is their sword.
4In the editor’s warning to Transfini et continue (Transfinite and continuous), we learn
that the manuscript for it had been given to Lautman, and was only able to be published
because his wife had kept it “religiously”. (Ibid.)
5And, perhaps Canguilhem had Lautman in mind, possibly among others, when he argued
– not so adroitly, or smartly – that Cavailles had acted independently from “race” or religion...
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From philosophy of mathematics to
sociology of computer science
The writer James Baldwin has famously said : we feel alone until we start
reading.
(He had meant the great works of literature6.)
History fulfills a similar function; in its own way, with its own means,
its own ends – its own limitations too.
—
Building intellectual models does not proceed of the same sentiment,
or in the same fashion as buying meat ‘by the pound’.
Cavailles’ notions of “accidents of history”, let alone “historical con-
tingencies” should leave at least some historians perplexed. (Cavailles :
Platonic philosopher, after all?)
Canguilhem’s remarks on Marxist interpretations, mass education or
“pure” resistance – those we could have done without, and would have
rather not have translated, or read.7
However none of this makes us forget the extraordinary courage with
which they had entered and explored other disciplines, coming from rare
backgrounds, delivering uneasy results (e.g. the normal and pathological
thesis of Canguilhem8);
fearlessness that had extended far beyond their books, as we know.
They moved forward, because they couldn’t move backwards.
They showed courage, and gave us courage.
We keep them alive in the only way that we can : by discussing them,
and their works – a genuine and sincere attempt to understand them.
In different people we find different things valuable, but needless to
say a “dialectic of concepts” we have not undertaken, or attempted...
—
“The philosophical principles of mathematics”, evoked by Elie Cartan
in the context of Cavailles and Lautman, are now succeeded by “the social
conditions of computer science”.
6“[They] taught me that the things that tormented me most were the very things that
connected me”... He mentioned Dostoevsky (The Brothers Karamazov) and Dickens.
7Although we were already somewhat familiar with Canguilhem’s conservative tendencies
where certain topics were concerned (e.g. education).
8A thesis that later became the basis for the normal-abnormal problematic of Foucault.
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Elie Cartan :
I’m a bit embarrassed, I have to say, being in this situation somewhat
like Mr. Jourdain, who spoke in prose without knowing it.
Mathematicians – at least a number of them, of whom I would consider
myself one – are little used to thinking about the philosophical principles
of their science.
When they hear a philosopher talk about their discipline, it interests
them, no doubt, but they don’t really know how to respond to the ideas
that they develop.
Of course I know Mr. Cavailles’ thesis and Mr. Lautman’s, having
been a member of the jury of both, but my situation is different : previ-
ously I was on the right side of the barricade, whereas today, I’m on the
other...
I have not quite understood what opposition existed between both
viewpoints; it seems to me that they are different rather than opposed.
My feeling is that the ideas of Mr. Cavailles relate to the very foun-
dations of mathematical thought, whereas Mr. Lautman has focused on
the current state, not of the whole of mathematics, but a certain number
of mathematical theories; and, in this regard, it is obvious that a certain
number of Mr. Lautman’s propositions are of particular interest to me :
the ones pertaining to the relationships between the local and the global,
for example.
Without a doubt these relationships are relevant for an important part
of mathematics. The theory of functions, in particular that of functions
of real variables, as we have conceived of it for 50 years, is unable to face
this issue of the global and local; its functions are too general for us to be
able to deduce global properties from local ones;
as for quasi-analytic functions [quasi-analytiques], which have been
introduced recently, something analogous happens : once we know in one
point the values of the function and those of its successive derivatives, it
[the function?] is completely defined in its entire field of existence.
In geometry – it was primarily geometry that Mr. Lautman had in
mind – one also finds extremely important problems that can be thought
in terms of this relationship between the global and local : if we take for
example, inside a space, a small portion of that space, can we then deduce
from the knowledge of this small piece a general knowledge of the entire
space? It is understood that we must assume the global properties simple
enough, without which this problem would not make sense.
These are, superficially, pure problems of geometry; in reality, they are
also problems of analysis. Let us take a portion of Riemann space : if you
assume that the functions involved in defining this space are analytic ones,
you’ll soon be faced with an extremely interesting problem, which is the
following : knowing one small piece of Riemann space, defined analytically
through its differential form, up to which point [how far] can we deduce
the global properties of this space?
This small piece may not be enough to be extended to form a complete
space; in general, this is what happens. If it can be extended to form a
full space, it can only be in one way, and with certain restrictions.
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There you have it, a problem of the relationships between global and
local which is not defined simply through geometric formulation [enunci-
ation], but which is linked to the existence of purely analytic properties
in the definition of that piece of space.
One could develop analogous considerations with regard to the rela-
tionships between the intrinsic and extrinsic. Given a surface inside a
space, do the intrinsic properties – assumed known – of the surface lead
to limitations of the properties of the space which contains it? There are
here extremely interesting problems; but we should note that they depend
not only on the geometric situation [position] of the problem, but on its
analytic one.
Mr. Lautman has given a certain number of other examples of such
problems : form and matter; group theory [the theory of groups].
All this is very interesting, but I don’t know to what degree it supports
the general thesis of Mr. Lautman, because I don’t understand what
dialectics are very well, and I need to remain on a purely technical ground
[terrain].
I don’t feel that that the considerations of Mr. Lautman are in conflict
with those of Mr. Cavailles. My impression being that Mr. Lautman
has considered certain specific problems of current mathematics, and a
certain number of philosophical ones. On the whole, I believe myself to
be in agreement with him, but unfortunately I’m unable to debate him
on that level.
In any case, as to the development of mathematics being autonomous
and unpredictable, I don’t think that we can contradict this proposition.
However history teaches us that that the history of mathematics – which
I have myself lived and known – has had moments of premonitions [pre-
visions d’avenir ] [predictions] : in 1900, a conference by Hilbert of the
future problems of mathematics took place, a remarkable one, in which
many of the problems that would preoccupy mathematics for the next
50 years had been laid down; and he had predicted exactly the kind of
problems which in fact were the problems of mathematics to come.
On the other hand, one could name a many conference by prominent
scientists, from various disciplines, whose predictions were a total dud.
Certainly there is something unpredictable about the development of
mathematics, and when reaching a certain age, one notices how over the
course of 20 or 30 years some theories have taken completely unexpected
turns; and that the point of view from which they had originally been con-
sidered has become a totally different one. These are internal necessities,
one must admit, that are later revealed. I’m thinking of topology, for in-
stance, this science which barely existed 50 years ago and now permeates
all other branches of mathematics.
Paul Levy : ... I’m a bit disconcerted to hear philosophers talk about
the science that I know, in terms that are totally foreign to me. I’m not
sure I understand what they’re saying (...)
[This debate took place in 1939]
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Henri Cartan :
It has been over 40 years since Cavailles wrote his work Axiomatic
method and formalism [Methode axiomatique et formalisme]. Since then
logic has changed a lot, while, on its side, mathematics has known spectac-
ular and often unpredictable developments, both due to the introduction
of new concepts and the solutions given to problems long unsolved (the
former often helped to solve the latter).
However, the reflections of the young Cavailles of 1937 have lost none of
their relevance today : they help us gain access to a period in the evolution
of mathematical ideas rich in controversies. Cavailles was perhaps the only
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